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TLS configuration and monitoring guide

TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, cipher choices, and a cert that actually validates. Here is what trips up real production endpoints and how Barrion catches it before users do.

What it is

TLS (Transport Layer Security) encrypts data between the browser and your server. TLS security monitoring means checking that your site uses strong protocols (TLS 1.2 or 1.3), secure cipher suites, and a valid certificate that is not expired or misconfigured.

Why it matters

Weak TLS (e.g. TLS 1.0/1.1, weak ciphers) can be exploited to intercept or tamper with traffic. Expired or invalid certificates cause browser warnings and break trust. Monitoring TLS helps you catch misconfigurations and certificate expiry before they become incidents.

How Barrion checks it

Barrion runs passive TLS checks: we connect to your HTTPS endpoint and verify protocol support, cipher suites, certificate validity and hostname match, and certificate chain. We report deprecated protocols, weak ciphers, and expiry. All checks are read-only and production-safe.

Verify it

curl -sI --tlsv1.2 https://example.com -o /dev/null -w '%{http_version} %{ssl_verify_result}\n'
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References

Related

FAQ

Common questions.

Do I need TLS 1.3, or is TLS 1.2 still fine?
TLS 1.2 with a modern cipher suite list is still compliant with PCI DSS, NIST SP 800-52r2, and BCP 195. TLS 1.3 is faster (one round-trip handshake, 0-RTT resumption) and drops the legacy cipher choices that cause most misconfigurations, so enable both and prefer 1.3 where the client supports it.
What is actually wrong with TLS 1.0 and 1.1?
They depend on MD5 and SHA-1 in the handshake, ship CBC modes vulnerable to BEAST and Lucky13, and have no defense against downgrade probes like POODLE. All major browsers removed support in 2020, and PCI DSS has required them disabled since June 2018.
Should I disable RSA key exchange?
Yes. Static RSA key exchange has no forward secrecy, so a single private key compromise decrypts every recorded session. Restrict your cipher list to ECDHE (or DHE) suites so each session derives a fresh ephemeral key.
Which cipher suites should I actually allow?
Follow Mozilla's intermediate profile: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 for 1.3, plus ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 and ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 for 1.2. Drop anything with CBC, RC4, 3DES, or NULL in the name.